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War – Second fase

Written by Pablo González and Pedro Nonay trying to understand War’s consequences.

Entry 1 – War (second phase)

Leap in scale.


September 30, 2022

In entry 15 that I wrote about the Ukrainian War, I said that this was the end of that series. It was not because the war was over, but because it seemed to me that it was changing its level, and that it was becoming something with more global effects.  Something that would have to be dealt with at a later time.

Recent events have confirmed this change of level. The leap in scale of the war has been made official

That is why I am writing again on the subject. But I will not do so as a continuation of the series of writings I finished in that Nntry 15, but as Entry 1 of a new series.

As I have already advanced in previous entries, it seems that Ukraine is only a battle within the real war, which is to change the world order and establish two blocks of countries, with little dealings between them and very different internal organization systems. One of them will be led by the USA (with Europe as a subject) and the other by China (with Russia as an ally or a subject, depending on its conclusion in Ukraine, which is basically what is decided in that battle). 

Other battles within this war are those of energy (the recent “accidents” in the Nord Stream pipeline are very significant), cereal (it seems that Russia may try to prohibit the sale of cereal to its enemy countries), inflation (to weaken the West), populism, with the same objective of weakening the West (the Italian elections are important), or the unwanted but probable invasion of Taiwan.

The fact is that, after a few days in which Ukraine had recovered some of what it had conquered from Russia (which seemed to weaken it), a cascade of declarations have occurred. I list them below, and I will try to “decode” them throughout this entry and the following ones:

In the following, I will try to go deeper into what happened and “read between the lines” of the statements. 

As always, my objective is not the journalistic one of recounting the past, but of trying to deduce the most probable future in order to be able to make the most appropriate personal decisions. Also as always, I welcome feedback from readers to help us all improve understanding.

The current situation.

The leap in scale of the war, which is how I have titled this entry, implies that the possibility of being a short and limited war in its geographical, social and economic repercussions is over (by limited, I do not mean that the repercussions are small, but that the others can be much worse).

In fact, that possibility is not yet over. There is a little less than a month to go before that happens. At that time, we will know if it is over or if we are headed for a long and serious war with major repercussions.

In this and the following entries I will try to justify that there is a not small possibility (I prefer to put it this way, rather than to say that it is big) that in this period the War will be over and the constituent period of the New World Order (the new Yalta Conference) will be opened. By the way, it is curious that Yalta is located in Crimea, which is the first place where Russia attacked Ukraine. It may be that the world order we have had since the end of WWII will end where it began.

The month is not just a guess. I will go deeper into the subject later, but I advance that the XX Congress of the Chinese Communist Party is scheduled for October 16. And I have already said in my previous writings that the decision on the end of the War can only be taken by China (sorry, but it is so), and that I believe that Xi Jinping is not going to make a decision of such caliber in his “election period”, that he will do it immediately afterwards. I also don’t think Putin will do anything big on dates uncomfortable for China.

The fact is that, as of today, the economic situation in the West is very regular, with inflation out of control, interest rates rising, unemployment also, energy very expensive and with a risk of shortage (higher in Europe than in the USA); populism on the rise (in the case of Italy); the anger of the population at maximum levels, …, and with many doubts as to whether it is worth continuing to support Ukraine or to think about “things at home” (doubts that could be the subject of an entire book).

As for Russia, the economy is not that bad (despite what they try to tell us), but discontent is starting to appear among its people for seeing too many coffins and potentially more after the new recruitments.

Ukraine is in ruins, but with morale a little high for having recovered something, and afraid to continue the war in the cold of winter.

And, China is angry about the confinements, and awaiting the Communist Party congress, but moderately calm economically, although with an eye on the problems of private real estate debt.

In entry 5 of my blog on the Ukrainian War I said that wars end when one of the contenders runs out of the economic capacity to continue them, or the capacity of suffering of their people to support them. I also said that, in particular, and having analyzed it as I did there:

We seem to have reached that point. The West’s economy is near collapse, and Russian society’s support for Putin is at risk (not as much as our press tells us, but somewhat). They can’t hold on much longer like this.

Without China’s support, neither can completely win over the other. And neither wants to pay the toll that China would ask for its support. They are faced with the alternatives of seeking a pact, of asking for China’s support, or of organizing a total destruction.

Influencers. Ray Dalio, Paul Mason, Aleksandr Duguin.

It seems to me that any of the three people I have mentioned would be very angry if they were in the same title as the others (I ask their forgiveness, while telling them that I have respect for them). But, it is true that all three are very relevant people in their circles, who are listened to by very different people, who then are the ones who end up moving the masses in different directions.

I follow and read with great interest all three of you. Let’s see your recent opinions:

Ray Dalio:

For those who don’t know, Ray Dalio is the founder of BridgeWater, which is one of the most relevant American investment funds. Also, maybe because he is a bit older, very rich, doesn’t need anything, is very smart, and doesn’t have to suck up to anyone, he can afford to write with a lot of freedom and independence (he seems to enjoy it and uses it as his honest legacy).

Ray Dalio is something akin to the guru that any of the major players in what I’m going to call “conventional Western” economics are bound to have as a headline.

A few years ago he wrote a highly recommended book in which he foresaw something similar to the collapse of the American empire. It was called The changing world order, which in Spanish can be translated as “el cambiante orden mundial” (the link I have posted is to a very good video summary of the book). The truth is that he did not consider the American empire as finished, but he saw it at risk and the need to do something to avoid it.

Last September 8, Ray Dalio wrote about the risks of escalating tensions between the US and China. It was about Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. He does not like what he sees, does not see a clear winner either, and prefers that they seek understanding. In other words, he does not at all see that the world economy can rest assured that the US has guaranteed and controlled power (even if others with less knowledge and less independence to speak out say so).

And on September 13, he wrote about inflation. He thinks that in the USA, because of the fight against inflation, interest rates may reach 4.5% before the end of the year, and that the stock markets will fall by 20%. That means a very weakened economy in the West. And so says one of the most important gurus of the Western economy.

He is giving warnings of the type: “I don’t care about almost everything, but if you want to continue, you’d better change a lot of things very quickly, because you are sinking”.

Paul Mason.

Also for those who do not know, Paul Mason is an English writer and journalist closely linked to the radical left. With a lot of quality of reasoning in his writings, like it or not to each one.

The truth is that almost all extreme and educated leftists in the West consider him a reference.

Just like everyone else. He has also evolved, and publicly acknowledges it. He says that he has abandoned his old Troskyite vision and has come to consider himself a radical social democrat (let each one interpret that definition).

On August 24 he has written an interesting (and somewhat puzzling to me) article. He did so in the wake of the murder of Duguin’s daughter in Russia. The article is entitled “How to stop fascism”. He comes to say that fascism arises from fear of freedom, and elaborates on it (quite well); that it is resurging (I think he is right); that Putin is a fascist (although he doesn’t say so expressly, what he says is that he has left realpolitik for ethno-nationalism); and that he must be stopped by arming Ukraine. The latter is the odd one to me. His followers on the radical Western left (like our Podemos) don’t exactly support arming Ukraine. … Maybe it will convince them.

My reading is that he is a radical leftist, but prefers the culture of the West. Something like: “I complain to try to improve this (in my view), but I prefer it to the other”.

The fact is that he is very concerned about escalation and is trying to change the approach of his followers.

Aleksandr Duguin.

For those who do not know, Aleksandr Duguin is a famous Russian media philosopher. He is known for theorizing the advent of Eurasia as an opposition to the USA. Some call him Putin’s Rasputin, but it is not at all clear that he has that influence over Putin, although he does have that influence over large Russian masses that Putin has to cater to. 

I find it curious how the Frenchman Emmanuel Carrere describes him. He says: “He is that kind of fascist, only he is not a clumsy and sickly young man, but an ogre. He is big, bearded, hairy, walks with the light steps of a dancer and has a curious way of balancing on one leg […]. He speaks fifteen languages, has read everything, drinks alcohol dry, has a frank laugh and is a mountain of knowledge and charm.”

He proposes a return to imperial Russia, without seeking capitalism or communism. He is associated with all the ultra-right, but he does not like that. He is more of an ethnic Russian power. And he prefers a Russia associated with Asia, rather than one associated with Europe. 

More or less, he is the one who is leading the now widespread idea in Russia that Putin is being soft on the war. The truth is that the demonstrations we get in the Western press tell us that they are something along the lines of “no war”, but they are more along the lines of: “Russia cannot lose a war. If you’re in it, fight harder” (although, of course, there is also someone who thinks the opposite).

On August 20, his daughter was killed in an attack that was supposedly aimed at him. This has made him even more popular. 

The idea of strong Russia close to Asia is very important in everything that is happening.

What Putin said.

Before going into the content of his speech, I consider it very important to pay attention to the date. The speech is dated September 21. And, … Putin met in person with Xi Jinping on September 15.

Let us remember that, although attempts are being made to weaken or minimize this alliance, it seems clear that Russia and China share (or at least agree on) strategies.

Let us also remember that, although there are many people who still believe that Russia is a power, the real power is China. Russia is not going to do anything big without China’s approval, despite Putin’s pride, who is not as crazy as we are told.

And let’s remember that the February 24 invasion of Ukraine took place immediately after the end of the Beijing Olympics. And that Putin attended the opening and had a meeting alone with Xi Jinping.

There is another thing to consider, which is not to be remembered, because it has not happened yet: on October 16 the XX Congress of the Chinese Communist Party will be held, in which Xi Jinping seeks his reelection, which is something he will achieve with little doubt, but before which it is not convenient for him to be inconvenienced.

My opinion is that, before starting the War, Putin went to “ask permission from Papa China”. And he was told: 

It is also my opinion that, at the Samarkand meeting, to which he has also gone to ask permission, Putin has been told:

With his speech, and with the recruitment of reservists, Putin is putting fear into the West. But it is clear that this recruitment needs more than a month to be fulfilled, to prepare (even if only a little) the soldiers, to equip them, and to move them to their destination in the war.

In other words, nothing much is going to happen until the end of October. However, everything will be ready by the end of the Congress. This does not mean that things will happen at that moment (pacts or cease-fires may arise), but it could happen.

Going to Putin’s speech, as in those historical moments words are very measured and many people review them, I think you have to see the literal of what he said, because in the omissions, or in the double interpretations there may be a lot of hidden meaning, which I will try to read between the lines. 

The verbatim of Putin’s speech can be seen here. here.

As this entry is getting long, I will cut it short here and continue in the next one, first analyzing this speech by Putin and the rest of the statements, and then talking about the offers that China can make to the world after its Congress, and the consequences of the annexation by Russia of the conquered regions.

If you have any feedback or comments on what I’ve written, feel free to send me an email at pgr@pablogonzalez.org.

You are allowed to use part of these writings. There’s no property rights. Please do it mentioning this websitte.

You can read another writings of Pablo here:

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