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Building the new order

Written by Pablo González and Pedro Nonay, trying to know how the new world will be.

Entry 16

International agricultural flows (II).


21 March 2024

La Serie S de John Deere, una de las cosechadoras más automatizadas del  mercado actual



You already know that I try to make each entry independent of the previous one, but that I have a common thread: I seek to deduce how the new world order is going to be organized after everything that is happening.

My new context selection.

I usually begin my entries with this “new context” heading in which I summarize the most relevant of what has happened since the previous entry regarding the evolution of the new order. My selection today is as follows:

La no entrevista a Putin

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Analysis by product.

Following the previous entry, I will now look at each product independently. 

I am doing so in the search for possible countries to “sign” to ensure that the Western bloc has its food supply solved.

However, it should be noted that the data I am going to work with are current (or not very old), while future developments may give different results. This may occur because more land is put into exploitation, the current land is sown with different grains, there are significant natural disasters, geopolitics change the destination of exports, there are technological innovations that improve yields, … That is, everything can change a lot in the future, but at least we must have a “snapshot” of the current situation.

A very visual way to prove that everything can change a lot (and has always changed), can be seen in this interesting animated graphic.

It is also interesting to recall that the management of international agricultural flows has already had an impact on geopolitics and economics in the past. A relatively recent example is what was called the “Great grain robbery“. It happened in 1972, when the Soviet Union needed to buy grain from the USA because of its droughts. The fact is that agriculture was subsidized in the USA, so the Russians were able to buy cheaply. Because there was greater demand (Russian), prices rose in the USA, which generated social and economic problems there. In other words, the USA had “subsidized” the Soviet Union (news here). In addition, there is a legend that the multinationals in the sector made huge profits by taking buying positions before informing the market of the sales to the Soviets.

Corn.

Regarding the uses of corn, it is important to know that only 10% is used for human consumption. The rest is used, almost equally, in animal feed and ethanol production (source: Ceres).

With the help of Pedro and Eloy Perez (thank you), I have obtained the following data concerning corn. They show the main producing, consuming, exporting, and importing countries, ordered from highest to lowest.

Interfaz de usuario gráfica, Tabla

Descripción generada automáticamente

I work with these data based on the column of the average of the last 3 harvests, since the averages avoid (somewhat) that the data are contaminated by punctual events. Based on these data it can be deduced that:

BRICS+ bloc:

Western Block:

Therefore, in the big numbers it seems that both blocks of countries would be almost balanced in terms of their capacity to have the corn they need. That is on the condition that Argentina is confirmed to be in the western bloc, and with the future of Ukraine in doubt.

However, the different elasticities of demand must be taken into account. When the demand is for food, it is very inelastic (e.g. Mexico, which needs corn for pancakes, with no possible substitute). It is not so inelastic when the demand is for biofuels or animal feed.

In any case, the seasonal variation of harvests in each country must be taken into account. It will surely happen that when a country needs to import, the country that is supposed to supply it has not harvested yet. That will be something to be solved by traders (and by some trading between blocks).

Wheat.

It is important to know that wheat is responsible for 20% of the calories consumed by the human population, mostly in the form of bread, pasta, cookies, … 65% of wheat production is used for this purpose. In addition, 17% is used for animal feed.

With the help of Pedro, and Eloy Perez (thank you), I have obtained the following data concerning wheat. 

As in the previous case, I work with these data based on the column of the average of the last 3 harvests. Based on these data it can be deduced that:

BRICS+ bloc:

Then, the main countries of the BRICs+ bloc import 41 MMT, and Russia exports 40 MMT. 

It might seem that there is balance, but the smaller countries in the bloc also need to import something. In other words, it seems that the BRICS+ bloc is not perfect in this. Much less so if it ends up turning out that Turkey will go for that bloc, which is doubtful, given that its current position is a bit ambiguous. 

Western Block:

Therefore, it seems that, as far as wheat is concerned, the western bloc is in surplus. Although it must be considered that the smaller countries of this bloc may need support.

Soy beans.

Before analyzing, it is important to know that the main use of soybeans (67%, according to Ceres) is for animal feed, and 17% is for vegetable oil, which is used for cooking and processed foods such as margarine. In other words, its effect on human food is mainly due to its capacity to “produce meat” through animal feed. On the other hand, a significant amount of soybean production in the USA is used to make biofuels, an issue that could be debated more than it is. 

With the help of Pedro, and Eloy Perez (thank you), I have obtained the following data concerning soybeans. 

As in the previous cases, I work with these data based on the column of the average of the last 3 harvests. Based on these data it can be deduced that:

BRICS+ bloc:

As the smaller countries in the bloc will also need some soybeans, it appears that the BRICS+ bloc is in deficit in soybeans by quantities that may exceed 17 MMT.

Western Block:

Then, as for the large countries, the Western bloc has a surplus of about 40 MMT of soybeans. It can devote them to the needs of the small countries of its bloc, or to negotiate with the BRICS+ bloc.

Rice.

With the help of Pedro, and Eloy Perez (thank you), I have obtained the following data concerning rice. 

As in the previous cases, I work with these data based on the column of the average of the last 3 harvests. Based on these data it can be deduced that:

BRICS+ bloc:

Then, it seems that, with respect to rice, in the large countries of the BRICS+ bloc, there is a surplus of 28 MMT, which may be sufficient for the needs of the smaller countries of the bloc.

Western Block:

Then, it seems that rice is not a major problem in the western bloc, unless the addition of small deficits in many small countries of the bloc would complicate the result.

Barley.

With the help of Pedro, and Eloy Perez (thank you), I have obtained the following data concerning barley. 

As in the previous cases, I work with these data based on the column of the average of the last 3 harvests. Based on these data it can be deduced that:

BRICS+ bloc:

In view of what is happening with the major countries of the BRICS+ bloc, it is clear that, even if all of Ukraine’s barley production were to remain in that bloc, there is a shortfall of about 10 MMT. And that is not counting the sum of what is needed by the smaller countries of that bloc.

Western Block:

Then, with respect to the large countries of the Western bloc, it appears that there are barley surpluses of about 17 MMT. Even if some of that is consumed by the smaller countries of the bloc, it seems clear that the rest will be destined to cover the shortages of the BRICS+ bloc.

Conclusions.

After the study done above, I repeat that the details not analyzed can change the picture a lot, as can future crop developments, new land devoted to cultivation, or geopolitical decisions about which country joins which bloc.

In any case, in this photograph, it seems that the result is:

In other words, in a larger summary, the West has few problems with food grains, and the BRICS+ bloc is worse off. 

This leads us to think that the West should use this “competitive advantage” to negotiate its problems in other areas, such as energy or raw materials. Especially taking into account that food, although it does not represent large economic figures in comparison with world export flows, does represent the peace of society avoiding famine (and no ruler wants a hungry population).

By the same token, the West should do everything in its power to prevent the BRICS+ bloc from recruiting for its “alignment” any country that would help it solve the problem. In that sense, it occurs to me that it may already be doing so, and that Argentina’s recent renunciation to join that bloc may be caused in that reason.

In fact, if we consider the BRICS+ bloc without Argentina and without Ukraine, we find that supply is controlled by Brazil and Russia, and demand is controlled by China. And that means great bargaining power for those who control the supply. And, since there is little doubt that Russia is part of the bloc, it turns out that Brazil becomes a “game changer”, since its hypothetical change of side destroys all balances.

On the other hand, I am told that 75% of Ukraine’s production is generated in the west of the Dniepper River, which is the part that seems to be attached to the Western bloc. In other words, the BRICS+ bloc cannot count on it.

Pedro uses an acronym to define the situation. He calls it BAU (Brazil, Argentina and Ukraine). He says that the three countries are “game changers”, that their change of sides would change the whole situation. He calls them “equidistant” countries. He says that, whichever bloc they belong to, they will assert their strength by threatening their bloc with change, for which they will try to have some trade door open with the other bloc.

Another aspect to be taken into account is that the European Union, seen in isolation, is in a bad situation. In general, it is in deficit. Moreover, climate change is making it worse off. And the CAP is not fulfilling its theoretical objective of providing incentives for solutions. Rather, the CAP can be seen as a disease that is metastasizing in Europe. Certainly, farmers’ revolts everywhere indicate something of the sort.

Final summary.

The schematic summary of the situation (with the risks involved in simplification) may be:

And these things influence geopolitics, because they affect food, which is something small in terms of the economic amounts it moves, compared to world exports, but basic to avoid famines and rebellions of the population.

As a clarification for the matter of being attentive to the BAU positions (Brazil Argentina and Ukraine), the following comments can be made:

Of course, if we go into detail, there are variations in the situation for each product. Moreover, it is important to know that, as of today, these three countries are acting as “equidistant”, since they export to both blocs. In any case, trying to see the situation as a whole, it can be schematized as follows: 

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Readings that have interested me.

In the process of writing this entry I have come across many issues of other subjects. I would like to share the following:

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That’s as far as I’ll go for today.

As always, I welcome comments on my email: pgonzalez@ie3.org

If you want me to include you on my sending list of emails advicing about new entries, please send me an email to pgonzalez@ie3.org. Of course, you can also send me opinions about what i have written.

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You can read another writings of Pablo here:

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